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Abstract
We revisit Zadeh’s notion of “evidence of the second kind” and show that it provides the
foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both
the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and Possibility theory. In this perspective,
Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while Possibil-
ity theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows
us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the
application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to
reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.
Keywords: Dempster-Shafer theory, possibility theory, fuzzy mass functions, uncertain
reasoning, likelihood, estimation, prediction.
1. Introduction
The theory of belief functions developed by Dempster [5] and Shafer [39] is a theory of
uncertain reasoning that puts the emphasis on the concept of evidence. It is based on the rep-
resentation of elementary pieces of evidence by belief functions (defined as completely mono-
tone set functions) and on their combination by an operator called the product-intersection
rule, or Dempster’s rule of combination. A belief function can be constructed by comparing
a piece evidence to a scale of canonical examples such as randomly coded messages, whose
meanings are determined by chance [40]. A belief function on a set Θ can be seen as be-
ing induced by a multi-valued mapping from a probability space to Ω; it is mathematically
equivalent to a random set [5, 34]. As rational beliefs are essentially determined by evidence,
the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory can be regarded as a general framework for reasoning with
uncertainty [11].
Shortly after the introduction of DS theory, Zadeh independently proposed another for-
malism, called Possibility Theory [54], in which the concept of “fuzzy restriction” plays a
Email address: Thierry.Denoeux@utc.fr (Thierry Denœux)
Preprint submitted to Fuzzy Sets and Systems April 27, 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
11
63
8v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 24
 A
pr
 20
20
central role (see, e.g., [12] for a recent review). A fuzzy restriction is typically imposed on
a variable X taking values in a set Θ by a statement of the form “X is F˜”, where F˜ is a
fuzzy subset of Θ. For instance, the statement “John is young” acts as a flexible constraint
on the age of John. Zadeh proposed to identify the membership function of the fuzzy set F˜
with a possibility distribution: for any θ ∈ Θ, F˜ (θ) is then both the degree of membership
of θ to the fuzzy set F˜ , and the degree of possibility that X takes value θ, knowing that “X
is F˜”. The possibility of a subset A ⊆ Θ is then the supremum of the degrees of possibility
pi(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
The mathematical connections between the two theories were rapidly pointed out [18],
namely: a possibility measure corresponds to a belief function induced by a multi-valued
mapping that assigns probabilities only to a collection of nested subsets. Such a belief func-
tion is said to be consonant. From this point of view, the formalism of belief functions
is more general than that of possibility theory. However, Dempster’s rule does not fit in
possibility theory as it does not preserve consonance: the combination of two possibility
measures by Dempster’s rule is not a possibility measure. Possibility theory has its own
conjunctive and disjunctive combination operators based on triangular norms and conorms
[21]: consequently, it is not a special case of DS theory, but a stand-alone framework. An
open question is whether DS and possibility theories should be regarded are two “com-
peting” models of uncertainty, which can be used interchangeably to reason with partial
information, or whether they should rather be considered as complementary, each theory
being suited to represent different kinds of uncertain evidence. If one adopts the latter view,
as I do in this paper, it makes sense to search for a more general theory that encompasses
belief functions, possibility measures, and their combination operators as special cases. In-
terestingly, elements of such a theory already exist, but they have received relatively little
attention until now.
The idea of combining DS and possibility theories can first be found in an early paper
by Zadeh [55]. Zadeh calls “evidence of the second kind” a pair (X,Π(Y |X)) in which X is
a discrete random variable on a set Ω and Π(Y |X) a collection of “conditioned pi-granules”,
i.e., conditional possibility distributions of Y given X = x, for all x ∈ Ω. The probability
distribution on X and the conditional possibility distributions together define a mixture of
possibility measures. If the random variable X is certain, then the mixture has only one
component and it boils down to a single possibility measure representing fuzzy evidence. If
the conditional possibility distributions take values in {0, 1}, we essentially get a DS belief
function, representing uncertain evidence. In general, Zadeh’s concept of “evidence of the
second kind” makes it possible to represent both fuzzy and uncertain evidence, and it lays
down the foundation of a general theory of uncertainty encompassing possibility theory and
DS theory as special cases. This theory, only sketched by Zadeh in [55] and much overlooked
in later work, is further explored in this paper.
The mathematical structure (X,Π(Y |X)) is actually related to the notion of random fuzzy
set, a concept that also appeared at the end of the 1970’s [24, 30, 31]. However, Zadeh’s
“evidence of the second kind” corresponds to an epistemic random fuzzy set, and not to a
model of a random mechanism for generating fuzzy data as considered in, e.g., [24, 30, 31]
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and in some of the subsequent literature on random fuzzy sets, also referred to a “fuzzy
random variables” [38, 25]. Zadeh’s seminal work has been followed by a few contributions
on “fuzzy belief structures” in the 1980’s and early 1990’s [27, 48, 50]. Applications to
classification, regression and missing data imputation were presented, respectively, in [15],
[36, 37] and [35]. However, in these papers, the formalism of fuzzy belief structures was
seen merely as a fuzzy generalization of DS mass functions, and not as a general concept
encompassing DS and possibility theories as special cases, a perspective that is adopted in
this paper.
A very important problem for which a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets
can be useful is statistical inference. In [39], Shafer proposed to treat the relative likelihood
function as the contour function or a consonant belief function. This view is quite appealing
and it was further justified axiomatically in [10]. However, it was later rejected by Shafer
[41] because it is not consistent with Dempster’s rule of combination: the belief function
induced by a joint random sample composed of two independent samples is not the orthog-
onal sum of the belief functions induced by each of the two samples considered separately.
Rather, relative likelihood functions induced by independent samples must be multiplied
and renormalized, an operation that is consistent with a possibilistic interpretation of the
likelihood [43, 1]. Yet, the limited expressiveness of possibility theory alone does not allow it
to represent probability distributions and their combination with likelihoods to yield poste-
rior distributions. The generalized setting proposed in this paper allows us to resolve these
difficulties, by viewing the likelihood function as defining a mass function with a single fuzzy
focal set. The resulting model still generalizes Bayesian inference as did Shafer’s original
model, while being consistent with Dempster’s rule of combination. To highlight the basic
principles without being distracted by mathematical intricacies, we will assume the variables
to be defined on finite domains throughout this paper. The case of infinite domains will be
addressed in a companion paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Dempster-Shafer and possibility theories
are first recalled in Section 2, where some new definitions and results are also given. The
more general random fuzzy set model is then exposed in Section 3. Finally, the application
to statistical inference is addressed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. DS and possibility theories
In this section, we consider a variable θ taking values in a finite set Θ, and we review
different classical models for representing and combining of evidence about θ. The case
of certain evidence is first recalled in Section 2.1. This simple case can be generalized to
uncertain evidence, leading to DS theory, or to fuzzy evidence, resulting in possibility theory.
These two theories are reviewed, respectively, in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
2.1. Certain evidence
Let F be a subset of Θ, and assume that we receive a piece of evidence that us that
θ ∈ F for sure, and nothing more. Given this evidence, a proposition “θ ∈ A” for some
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A ⊆ Θ is possible if and only if F ∩ A 6= ∅, and it is certain if and only if F ⊆ A. We can
define two set functions ΠF and NF from the power set 2
Θ to {0, 1}, as
ΠF (A) = I(F ∩ A 6= ∅)
and
NF (F ) = I(F ⊆ A),
where I(·) is the indicator function [22]. We can remark that ΠF (A) = 1 if and only if there
is some θ ∈ A that belongs to F . We can thus write, equivalently,
ΠF (A) = max
θ∈A
F (θ), (1)
where F (·) denotes the characteristic function of set F . The possibility value of {θ}, denoted
by piF (θ), is
piF (θ) := ΠF ({θ}) = F (θ). (2)
Furthermore, the proposition F ⊆ A is equivalent to F ∩ Ac = ∅, where Ac denotes the
complement of A. Consequently, we have
NF (A) = 1− ΠF (Ac). (3)
It is clear that, for any two subsets A and B of Θ, the following equalities hold:
ΠF (A ∪B) = ΠF (A) ∨ ΠF (B) (4)
and
NF (A ∩B) = NF (A) ∧NF (B), (5)
where ∨ and ∧ denote, respectively, the maximum and minimum operators. Functions ΠF
and NF can be called, respectively, Boolean possibility and necessity measures, and function
piF : Θ→ {0, 1} can be called a Boolean possibility distribution.
A subset A ⊆ Θ is possible if at least one element θ ∈ A is possible (i.e., belongs to
F ). This is captured by function ΠF . We can also define the stronger notion of guaranteed
possibility [22]: A ⊆ Θ is “guaranteed possible” if all its elements are possible, i.e., if A ⊆ F .
This notion is captured by the guaranteed possibility function
∆F (A) := I(A ⊆ F ) = min
θ∈A
F (θ). (6)
We can also define a dual “potential certainty” function, ∇F (A) = 1−∆F (Ac), which equals
one if and only if there is some θ outside A that is not possible, i.e., if A ∪ F 6= Θ.
If we now have two pieces of evidence telling us that θ ∈ F for sure and θ ∈ G for sure,
and if we consider that both sources can be trusted, then we can infer that θ ∈ F ∩G. The
combined Boolean possibility distribution is, thus,
piF∩G(θ) := piF (θ) ∧ piG(θ). (7)
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If, on the other hand, we only consider that at least one of the two sources can be trusted,
then we can infer that θ ∈ F ∪G, and the combined Boolean possibility distribution is
piF∪G(θ) := piF (θ) ∨ piG(θ). (8)
This simple model can be extended in two ways, by allowing the piece of information to
be uncertain, or fuzzy. These two extensions correspond, respectively, to Dempster-Shafer
(DS) and Possibility theories, which are recalled in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 below.
2.2. Uncertain evidence: DS theory
Let us now assume that we receive a piece of evidence that can be interpreted in different
ways, with given probabilities [39, 11]. Let Ω be the set of interpretations, assumed to be
finite. If interpretation ω ∈ Ω holds, then the evidence tells us that θ belongs to some
nonempty subset Γ(ω) ⊆ Θ, and nothing more. We further assume that we can assess
probabilities on Ω, on which we define a probability measure P . The tuple (Ω, 2Ω, P,Γ),
where Γ is a mapping from Ω to 2Θ is a random set. We define the corresponding mass
function m : 2Θ to [0, 1] as
m(A) := P ({ω ∈ Ω : Γ(ω) = A}) ,
for all nonempty subset A ⊆ Θ, and m(∅) = 0. A subset F such that m(F ) > 0 is called a
focal set of m. We denote the focal sets by F1, . . . , Ff , and their masses by mi := m(Fi) for
i = 1, . . . , f . A mass function is said to be logical if it has only one focal set, and Bayesian
if all of its focal sets are singletons.
If interpretation ω holds, we know that θ ∈ Γ(ω). The possibility and necessity that
θ ∈ A are then, respectively, ΠΓ(ω)(A) and NΓ(ω)(A). We can then compute the expected
possibility and the expected necessity of the proposition “θ ∈ A” as, respectively,
Plm(A) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})ΠΓ(ω)(A) =
f∑
i=1
miΠFi(A) =
f∑
i=1
miI(Fi ∩ A 6= ∅) (9)
and
Belm(A) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})NΓ(ω)(A) =
f∑
i=1
miNFi(A) =
f∑
i=1
miI(Fi ⊆ A). (10)
These two functions are called, respectively, plausibility and a belief functions. If m has
only one focal set F , it is clear that functions Plm and Belm boil down, respectively, to
the Boolean possibility and necessity functions ΠF and NF reviewed in Section 2.1. In
the general case, they are mixtures of such functions. The restriction of function Plm to
singletons, denoted as plm(θ) := Plm({θ}), is called the contour function associated to m.
It is equal to function piF when m has only one focal set F .
Functions Plm and Belm are linked by the duality relation Belm(A) = 1 − Plm(Ac),
which is a direct consequence of (3). Shafer [39] shows that a mapping Bel : 2Θ → [0, 1] can
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be written in the form (10) if and only if Bel(∅) = 0, Bel(Θ) = 1, and Bel is completely
monotone, i.e.,
Bel
(
k⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≥
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,k}
(−1)|I|+1Bel
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
(11)
for any k ≥ 2 and any collection A1, . . . , Ak of subsets of Θ.
In addition to the expected possibility and necessity, we can also compute the expected
guaranteed possibility of the proposition “θ ∈ A” as
Qm(A) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})∆Γ(ω)(A) =
f∑
i=1
mi∆Fi(A) =
f∑
i=1
miI(A ⊆ Fi). (12)
Function Qm is called the commonality function induced by m [39]; it plays an important
role in DS theory, as will be shown below. The dual function ∇m(A) = 1 − Qm(Ac) could
also be defined, but its interpretation in DS theory is less clear. Functions m, Belm, Plm
and Qm are in one-to-one correspondence and any one of them allows us to recover the other
three. They can thus be considered as different facets of the same information.
Dempster’s rule. Let us now assume that we have two mass functions m1 and m2 on Θ
induced by independent pieces of evidence, i.e., by independent random sets (Ω1, 2
Ω1 , P1,Γ1)
and (Ω2, 2
Ω2 , P2,Γ2). We further assume that both pieces of evidence are reliable, i.e., if the
pair of interpretations (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω1×Ω2 holds, then we know for sure that θ ∈ Γ∩(ω1, ω2) :=
Γ1(ω1)∩Γ2(ω2), provided that Γ1(ω1)∩Γ2(ω2) 6= ∅. To compute the probability that (ω1, ω2)
holds, we need to compute the product measure P1 ⊗ P2 and to condition it on the event
Θ∗ := {(ω′1, ω′2) ∈ Ω1 × Ω2 : Γ∩(ω′1, ω′2) 6= ∅}. (13)
The orthogonal sum [39] of m1 and m2 is then defined, for all A ∈ 2Θ, as
(m1 ⊕m2)(A) := P ({(ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω1 × Ω2 : Γ∩(ω1, ω2) = A} | Θ∗) (14a)
=
P ({(ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω1 × Ω2 : Γ∩(ω1, ω2) = A} ∩Θ∗)
P (Θ∗)
(14b)
=

0 if A = ∅∑
F∩G=Am1(F )m2(G)∑
F∩G6=∅m1(F )m2(G)
otherwise,
(14c)
which is well defined on the condition that P (Θ∗) > 0. The binary operation ⊕ is called
Dempster’s rule. It is commutative and associative. The quantity
κ = 1− P (Θ∗) =
∑
F∩G=∅
m1(F )m2(G)
is called the degree of conflict between m1 and m2.
The following two propositions are important in practice [39].
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Proposition 1. Let m1 and m2 be two mass functions on Θ. The commonality function
Qm1⊕m2 corresponding to the orthogonal sum m1 ⊕m2 is proportional to the product of the
commonality functions Qm1 and Qm2 corresponding to m1 and m2:
Qm1⊕m2 =
1
1− κQm1Qm2 .
As Qm({θ}) = plm(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, we also have plm1⊕m2 = (1− κ)−1plm1plm2.
Proposition 2. Let m1 be a mass function and let m2 be a Bayesian mass function. Then,
the mass function m1 ⊕m2 is Bayesian; it is defined as
(m1 ⊕m2)({θ}) = plm1(θ)m2({θ})∑
θ′∈Θ plm1(θ
′)m2({θ′})
for all θ ∈ Θ.
As mentioned above, Dempster’s rule is based on the assumption that both pieces of
evidence are reliable. We can also weaken this assumption and only assume that at least
one of them is reliable [20, 44]. If the pair of interpretations (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω1 × Ω2 holds, we
can then deduce that θ ∈ Γ∪(ω1, ω2) := Γ1(ω1) ∪ Γ2(ω2). Still assuming the two pieces of
evidence to be independent, we get the combined mass function m1 uniondbl m2 defined, for all
A ∈ 2Θ, as
(m1 uniondblm2)(A) = P ({(ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω1 × Ω2 : Γ∪(ω1, ω2) = A}) (15a)
=
∑
F∪G=A
m1(F )m2(G) (15b)
We note that normalization is not needed in this case, as Γ∪(ω1, ω2) cannot be empty as
long as Γ1(ω1) and Γ2(ω2) are nonempty.
Degree of belief in a fuzzy event. The notions of a fuzzy event and its probability were first
defined by Zadeh [52]. Given a probability space (Θ,A, P ), a fuzzy event is a fuzzy subset
A˜ of Θ with measurable membership function, and the probability of A˜ is defined as the
expectation of its membership function. When Θ is finite, as assumed throughout his paper,
we thus have
P (A˜) =
∑
θ∈Θ
P ({θ})A˜(θ), (16)
where A˜(θ) denotes the degree of membership of θ in the fuzzy set A˜. It can be shown [17]
that P (A˜) can also be written as:
P (A˜) =
∫ 1
0
P (αA˜)dα, (17)
where αA˜ = {θ ∈ Θ : A˜(θ) ≥ α} is the α-cut of A˜.
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Smets [42] extended this definition to the case where uncertainty on Θ is defined by
a mass function m. He defined the degrees of belief and plausibility of fuzzy event A˜ as,
respectively, the lower and upper expectations of its membership function:
Belm(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
mi min
θ∈Fi
A˜(θ) (18a)
Plm(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
mi max
θ∈Fi
A˜(θ). (18b)
Similarly to (17), we have
Belm(A˜) =
∫ 1
0
Belm(
αA˜)dα (19a)
Plm(A˜) =
∫ 1
0
Plm(
αA˜)dα. (19b)
We note that Belm(A˜) and Plm(A˜) are the Choquet integrals of A˜(·) with respect to Bel
and Pl, respectively. It is clear that definition (18) coincides with (16) when m is Bayesian.
Let F(Θ) be the set of all fuzzy subsets of Θ. It becomes a lattice when equipped with fuzzy
intersection and union defined, respectively, as
(A˜ ∧ B˜)(θ) = A˜(θ) ∧ B˜(θ) (20a)
and
(A˜ ∨ B˜)(θ) = A˜(θ) ∨ B˜(θ) (20b)
for all θ ∈ Θ, where ∨ and ∧ denote, respectively, the minimum and the maximum. As shown
by Smets [42], the mapping Bel from F(Θ) to [0, 1] defined by (18) is a belief function on
(F(Θ),∧,∨), i.e., it verifies the following inequalities for any k ≥ 2 and countable collection
A˜1, . . . , A˜k of fuzzy subsets of Θ:
Belm
(
k∨
i=1
A˜i
)
≥
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,k}
(−1)|I|+1Belm
(∧
i∈I
A˜i
)
. (21)
Although Smets did not consider extending the commonality function to fuzzy events,
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this can also be done as follows:
Qm(A˜) :=
∫ 1
0
Q(αA˜)dα (22a)
=
∫ 1
0
(
f∑
i=1
miI(
αA˜ ⊆ Fi)
)
dα (22b)
=
f∑
i=1
mi
∫ 1
0
I(αA˜ ⊆ Fi)dα (22c)
=
f∑
i=1
mi
(
1−max
θ 6∈Fi
A˜(θ)
)
. (22d)
2.3. Fuzzy evidence: Possibility theory
As recalled in Section 1, possibility theory introduced by Zadeh [54] extends the simple
model outlined in Section 2.1 by considering statements of the form “θ is F˜”, where F˜ si a
normal fuzzy subset of Θ, i.e., a fuzzy subset verifying F˜ (θ) = 1 for some θ ∈ Θ (see also
[21, 22, 12]). Zadeh [54] defines the possibility measure ΠF˜ : 2
Θ → [0, 1] induced by the piece
of information “θ is F˜” as
ΠF˜ (A) := maxθ∈A
F˜ (θ), (23)
which generalizes (2). The dual necessity measure is defined as
NF˜ (A) := 1− ΠF˜ (Ac) = minθ 6∈A
[
1− F˜ (θ)
]
(24)
for all A ⊆ Θ, which extends (3). The corresponding possibility distribution is defined as
piF˜ (θ) = ΠF˜ ({θ}) = F˜ (θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ. It is, thus, numerically equal to F˜ .
It can easy be seen that
ΠF˜ (A) =
∫ 1
0
ΠαF˜ (A)dα (25a)
and
NF˜ (A) =
∫ 1
0
NαF˜ (A)dα. (25b)
Trivially, we have ΠF˜ (∅) = NF˜ (∅) = 0, ΠF˜ (Θ) = NF˜ (Θ) = 1, and NF˜ (A) ≤ ΠF˜ (A) for
all A ⊆ Θ. Furthermore, the following equalities hold:
ΠF˜ (A ∪B) = ΠF˜ (A) ∨ ΠF˜ (B) (26a)
and
NF˜ (A ∩B) = NF˜ (A) ∧NF˜ (B) (26b)
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for all A,B ⊆ Θ. These equalities generalize (4) and (5).
In addition to the possibility and necessity measures defined by (26), Dubois and Prade
[22] also generalize the notion of guaranteed possibility (6) as
∆F˜ (A) := minθ∈A
F˜ (θ) =
∫ 1
0
∆αF˜ (A)dα, (27)
and that of potential certainty as
∇F˜ (A) := 1−∆F˜ (Ac) = maxθ 6∈A
[
1− F˜ (θ)
]
=
∫ 1
0
∇αF˜ (A)dα. (28)
The quantity ∆F˜ (A) measures the extent to which all values in A are actually possible
given the statement “θ is F˜”, while ∇F˜ (A) measures the extent to which at least one value
θ outside A has a low degree of possibility. Clearly, the following equality holds for any
subsets A and B of Θ:
∆F˜ (A ∪B) = ∆F˜ (A) ∧∆F˜ (B). (29)
Combination of possibility measures. Let us now assume that we receive two pieces of evi-
dence that tell us that “θ is F˜” and “θ is G˜”, where F˜ and G˜ are two normal fuzzy subsets
of Θ. These fuzzy sets induce two possibility distributions piF˜ and piG˜. How should they
be combined? If both sources are assumed to be reliable, then it makes sense to infer that
“θ is F˜ ∩ G˜”, where F˜ ∩ G˜ denotes the intersection of fuzzy sets F˜ and G˜. There are, how-
ever, two difficulties. First, there are several possible definitions of fuzzy set intersection.
Zadeh [51] defines the intersection of fuzzy sets F˜ and G˜ as
(F˜ ∧ G˜)(θ) = F˜ (θ) ∧ G˜(θ),
but he also proposes the following alternative definition:
(F˜ · G˜)(θ) = F˜ (θ) · G˜(θ).
It is clear that both definitions extend the usual set intersection. Later, these two definitions
have been generalized as (F˜ ∩>G˜)(θ) = F˜ (θ)>G˜(θ), where > is a triangular norm (or t-norm
for short) [16]. The minimum is the largest t-norm. It is consistent with the definition of
inclusion as F˜ ⊆ G˜ iff F˜ ≤ G˜: F˜ ∧ G˜ is then the largest fuzzy set included in F˜ and G˜. It
is also idempotent, i.e., F˜ ∧ F˜ = F˜ ; consequently, there is no reinforcement effect when two
pieces of evidence are identical, which makes minimum-intersection combination useful for
combining evidence from dependent and possibly redundant sources. In contrast, product
intersection has a reinforcement effect that is appropriate when the sources are assumed to
be independent [23].
The second difficulty when combining possibility distributions conjunctively is that the
intersection of two fuzzy sets F˜ and G˜ may not be normal, and some normalization step
has to take place. The standard normalization procedure divides F˜ ∩ G˜ by its height (i.e.,
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supremum). As a consequence, the associativity property is usually lost. However, the
normalized product intersection, defined as
F˜  G˜ = F˜ · G˜
h(F˜ · G˜) , (30)
is associative [23]. We give a simple proof of this well-known result below for completeness.
Proposition 3. Let F˜ , G˜ and H˜ be fuzzy subsets of Θ, and let  denote the normalized
intersection based on the product t-norm. Then,
(F˜  G˜) H˜ = F˜  (G˜ H˜).
Proof. The key property of the product-based intersection is that, for any α ≥ 0, h((αF˜ ) ·
G˜) = h(F˜ · (αG˜)) = αh(F˜ · G˜). Using this property, we have
(F˜  G˜) H˜ = F˜ ·G˜h(F˜ G˜) · H˜
h
(
F˜ ·G˜
h(F˜ ·G˜) · H˜
) = F˜ · G˜ · H˜/h(F˜ · G˜)
h(F˜ · G˜ · H˜)/h(F˜ · G˜) =
F˜ · G˜ · H˜
h(F˜ · G˜ · H˜) .
and, by the commutativity of ,
F˜  (G˜ H˜) = (G˜ H˜) F˜ = F˜ · G˜ · H˜
h(F˜ · G˜ · H˜) .
If we can only assume that at least one source is reliable, then we can only deduce that
“θ is F˜ ∪ G˜”, where F˜ ∪ G˜ denotes the union of fuzzy sets F˜ and G˜. The union F˜ ∪ G˜
is usually defined as (F˜ ∪ G˜)(θ) = F˜ (θ)⊥G˜(θ), where ⊥ is a t-conorm. To each t-norm >
corresponds a dual t-conorm ⊥ defined as u⊥v = 1 − [(1 − u)>(1 − v)]. The t-conorms
corresponding to the minimum and the product are, respectively, the maximum and the
probabilistic sum u⊥v = u+ v − uv.
Relation between possibility measures and belief functions. It can easily be shown that the
mapping NF˜ : 2
Ω → [0, 1] is completely monotone (11), i.e., it is a belief function, and ΠF˜
is the dual plausibility function [22]. Actually, a belief function Belm and the associated
plausibility function Plm verify the equalities
Belm(A ∩B) = Belm(A) ∨Belm(B)
and
Plm(A ∪B) = Plm(A) ∨ Pl(mB)
iff the corresponding mass function m is consonant [39], i.e., if for any pair of focal sets Fi
and Fj, we have Fi ⊂ Fj or Fj ⊂ Fi. To each possibility distribution piF˜ thus corresponds a
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unique consonant mass function mF˜ , which can be recovered as follows [18]. Let θ1, . . . , θq
denote the elements of Θ, assumed to be indexed in such a way that
1 = piF˜ (θ1) ≥ piF˜ (θ2) ≥ . . . ≥ pi(F˜ θq).
The corresponding mass function mF˜ is given by
mF˜ ({θ1, . . . , θi}) = piF˜ (θi)− piF˜ (θi+1) (31)
for i = 1, . . . , q − 1, and mF˜ (Θ) = piF˜ (θq). It can easily be checked that function BelmF˜ ,
Plm
F˜
, plm
F˜
and Qm
F˜
are equal, respectively, to NF˜ , ΠF˜ , piF˜ and ∆F˜ .
However, the combination of two consonant mass functions by Dempster’s rule is no
longer consonant. To combine two consonant belief functions Bel1 and Bel2 induced by
independent sources, we must, therefore, consider the evidence on which they are based:
• If they are based on certain but vague (fuzzy) evidence such as θ is F˜ and θ is G˜, then
they should be combined by the normalized product intersection (30);
• If they are based on uncertain but crisp (nonfuzzy) evidence pointing to consonant
focal sets, then the corresponding consonant mass functions should be combined by
Dempster’s rule (14).
The two combination mechanisms yield different results but, as a consequence of Proposition
1, the contour functions are proportional, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1. Let Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4}. Assume that we receive the following pieces of evidence
from two independent and reliable sources:
• First piece of evidence: “θ is F˜”, with
F˜ =
{
θ1
0.5
,
θ2
1
,
θ3
0.8
,
θ4
0.3
}
;
• Second piece of evidence: “θ is G˜”, with
G˜ =
{
θ1
0.3
,
θ2
0.7
,
θ3
1
,
θ4
0.2
}
;
These pieces of evidence can be represented by possibility distributions piF˜ and piG˜ and com-
bined by (30), resulting in the combined possibility distribution piF˜G˜, with F˜  G˜ equal
to
F˜  G˜ = { θ1
0.15/0.8
,
θ2
0.7/0.8
,
θ3
1
,
θ4
0.06/0.8
}
=
{
θ1
0.1875
,
θ2
0.875
,
θ3
1
,
θ4
0.075
}
.
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The consonant mass function mF˜G˜ corresponding to piF˜G˜ is
mF˜G˜({θ3}) = 1− 0.875 = 0.125
mF˜G˜({θ2, θ3}) = 0.875− 0.1875 = 0.6875
mF˜G˜({θ1, θ2, θ3}) = 0.1875− 0.075 = 0.1125
mF˜G˜(Θ) = 0.075.
Consider now another situation in which we receive two pieces of evidence represented by
the following consonant mass functions:
mF˜ ({θ2}) = 1− 0.8 = 0.2
mF˜ ({θ2, θ3}) = 0.8− 0.5 = 0.3
mF˜ ({θ1, θ2, θ3}) = 0.5− 0.3 = 0.2
mF˜ (Θ) = 0.3,
and
mG˜({θ3}) = 1− 0.7 = 0.3
mG˜({θ2, θ3}) = 0.7− 0.3 = 0.4
mG˜({θ1, θ2, θ3}) = 0.3− 0.2 = 0.1
mG˜(Θ) = 0.2.
Mass functions mF˜ and mG˜ induce the same belief functions as, respectively, F˜ and G˜. Yet,
they are combined differently by Dempster’s rule. Their orthogonal sum mF˜ ⊕mG˜ is
(mF˜ ⊕mG˜)({θ3}) = 0.24/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.255
(mF˜ ⊕mG˜)({θ2}) = 0.14/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.149
(mF˜ ⊕mG˜)({θ2, θ3}) = 0.41/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.436
(mF˜ ⊕mG˜)({θ1, θ2, θ3}) = 0.09/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.0957
(mF˜ ⊕mG˜)(Θ) = 0.06/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.0638,
which is different from mF˜G˜. In particular, mF˜⊕mG˜ is not consonant. Its contour function
of mF˜ ⊕mG˜ is
plm
F˜
⊕m
G˜
(θ1) = (0.09 + 0.06)/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.160
plm
F˜
⊕m
G˜
(θ2) = (0.14 + 0.41 + 0.09 + 0.06)/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.745
plm
F˜
⊕m
G˜
(θ3) = (0.24 + 0.41 + 0.09 + 0.06)/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.851
plm
F˜
⊕m
G˜
(θ4) = 0.06/(1− 0.06) ≈ 0.0638.
It can be checked that piF˜G˜ and plmF˜⊕mG˜ are proportional, with piF˜G˜/plmF˜⊕mG˜ = 1.175.
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The above considerations show that it is important, in practice, to determine whether
a piece of evidence should be represented by a possibility distribution or by a consonant
mass function. It seems reasonable to use the former representation for certain but fuzzy
evidence such as conveyed, e.g., by natural language, as in the proposition “John is tall”.
More surprisingly, it appears that statistical evidence should also be represented in that
way, as will be shown in Section 4. In contrast, consonant evidence usually arises when
combining several elementary pieces of evidence, such as simple mass functions of the form
mi(Fi) = pi, mi(Θ) = 1 − pi with F1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Ff . Such simple mass functions may be
obtained by combining expert opinions or sensor readings telling us that Fi ⊆ Θ with
confidence degree pi.
Possibility and necessity of a fuzzy event. In [54], Zadeh defines the possibility and the
necessity of a fuzzy event A˜ ∈ F(Θ) as
Π
(S)
F˜
(A˜) := max
θ∈Θ
(A˜ ∧ F˜ )(θ) = h(A˜ ∧ F˜ ). (32)
and
N
(S)
F˜
(A˜) := 1− Π(S)
F˜
(A˜c) (33a)
= 1−max
θ∈Θ
[1− A(θ)] ∧ F˜ (θ) (33b)
= min
θ∈Θ
{
1− [1− A˜(θ)] ∧ F˜ (θ)
}
(33c)
= min
θ∈Θ
A˜(θ) ∨ [1− F˜ (θ)] (33d)
= min
θ∈Θ
(A˜ ∨ F˜ c)(θ). (33e)
We note that Π
(S)
F˜
(A˜) and N
(S)
F˜
(A˜) are Sugeno integrals of A˜(·) with respect to ΠF˜ and NF˜ ,
respectively [16, Section 7.6.2]. We can also remark that Int(A˜, F˜ ) := h(A˜∧ F˜ ) can be seen
as a degree of intersection of A˜ and F˜ , whereas Incl(F˜ , A˜) := minθ∈Θ(A˜∨ F˜ c)(θ) can be seen
as a degree of inclusion of F˜ in A˜.
It is easy to check that Π
(S)
F˜
and N
(S)
F˜
are still, respectively, possibility and necessity
measures in the lattice (F(Θ),∧,∨), as
Π
(S)
F˜
(A˜ ∨ B˜) = Π(S)
F˜
(A˜) ∨ Π(S)
F˜
(B˜) (34a)
and
N
(S)
F˜
(A˜ ∧ B˜) = N (S)
F˜
(A˜) ∧N (S)
F˜
(B˜) (34b)
for all fuzzy sets A˜ and B˜, which generalize (4)-(5). It is also easy to show that N
(S)
F˜
(A˜) ≤
Π
(S)
F˜
(A˜) for all A˜ ∈ F(Θ) [19]. Dubois and Prade [19] also show that N (S)
F˜
is a belief function
in the lattice (F(Θ),∧,∨), and Π(S)
F˜
is the dual plausibility function.
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Dubois et al. review generalizations of (32)-(33) as well as alternative definitions in [16,
Section 7.6]. In particular, they remark that we can identify ΠF˜ and NF˜ to, respectively,
the plausibility function Plm
F˜
and the belief function Belm
F˜
induced by the consonant mass
function mF˜ defined by (31). We can then define the possibility and necessity of a fuzzy
event A˜ from (18) and (19) by the Choquet integrals:
Π
(C)
F˜
(A˜) :=
∫ 1
0
ΠF˜ (
αA˜)dα =
∑
A⊆Θ
mF˜ (A) maxθ∈A
A˜(θ) = Plm
F˜
(A˜) (35a)
N
(C)
F˜
(A˜) :=
∫ 1
0
NF˜ (
αA˜)dα =
∑
A⊆Θ
mF˜ (A) minθ∈A
A˜(θ) = Belm
F˜
(A˜). (35b)
From (25), we then have
Π
(C)
F˜
(A˜) =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
Πβ F˜ (
αA˜)dβ
)
dα =
∫ 1
0
Πβ F˜ (A˜)dβ (36a)
and
N
(C)
F˜
(A˜) =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
Nβ F˜ (
αA˜)dβ
)
dα =
∫ 1
0
Nβ F˜ (A˜)dβ (36b)
with
Πβ F˜ (A˜) =
∫ 1
0
Πβ F˜ (
αA˜)dα = max
θ∈β F˜
A˜(θ) = max
{θ:F˜ (θ)≥β}
A˜(θ) (36c)
and
Nβ F˜ (A˜) =
∫ 1
0
Nβ F˜ (
αA˜)dα = min
θ∈β F˜
A˜(θ) = min
{θ:F˜ (θ)≥β}
A˜(θ) (36d)
As N
(S)
F˜
, function N
(C)
F˜
defined by (35b) is a belief function on the lattice (F(Θ),∧,∨), and
Π
(C)
F˜
is its dual plausibility function. However, Π
(C)
F˜
and N
(C)
F˜
are no longer possibility and
necessity measures, as they fail to satisfy the basic axioms (34) [19].
The following example illustrates the difference between Π
(S)
F˜
and Π
(C)
F˜
.
Example 2. Consider the fuzzy sets F˜ and G˜ of Example 1. We have
Π
(S)
F˜
(G˜) = h(F˜ ∧ G˜) = h
({
θ1
0.3
,
θ2
0.7
,
θ3
0.8
,
θ4
0.2
})
= 0.8
and
N
(S)
F˜
(G˜) = 1− h(F˜ ∧ G˜c) = 1− h
({
θ1
0.5
,
θ2
0.3
,
θ3
0
,
θ4
0.3
})
= 1− 0.5 = 0.5,
but
Π
(C)
F˜
(G˜) = 0.2× 0.7 + 0.3× 1 + 0.2× 1 + 0.3× 1 = 0.94.
and
N
(C)
F˜
(G˜) = 0.2× 0.7 + 0.3× 0.7 + 0.2× 0.3 + 0.3× 0.2 = 0.47.
15
To conclude this section, we can remark that the guaranteed possibility function (27)
can be extended to fuzzy events as well. It can easily be seen that, for crisp A,
min
θ∈A
F˜ (θ) = min
θ∈Θ
(Ac ∨ F˜ )(θ) = Incl(A, F˜ ).
A natural definition for the guaranteed possibility of fuzzy event A˜, in the spirit of Zadeh’s
definitions (32)-(33) for the possibility and belief of a fuzzy event is, thus,
∆
(S)
F˜
(A˜) := Incl(A˜, F˜ ) = min
θ∈Θ
(A˜c ∨ F˜ )(θ). (37)
As a generalization of (29), we have
∆
(S)
F˜
(A˜ ∨ B˜) = ∆(S)
F˜
(A˜) ∧∆(S)
F˜
(B˜). (38)
Alternatively, we can define the guaranteed possibility of fuzzy event A˜ from (22) by the
Choquet integral
∆
(C)
F˜
(A˜) :=
∫ 1
0
∆F˜ (
αA˜)dα =
∑
A⊆Θ
mF˜ (A)
(
1−max
θ 6∈A
A˜(θ)
)
dα = Qm
F˜
(A˜). (39)
Unfortunately, the equality (38) does not hold anymore with this alternative definition.
Example 3. Consider again the fuzzy sets F˜ and G˜ of Examples 1 and 2. From
G˜c ∨ F˜ =
{
θ1
0.7
,
θ2
1
,
θ3
0.8
,
θ4
0.8
}
,
we have ∆
(S)
F˜
(G˜) = 0.7, but
∆
(C)
F˜
(G˜) = 0.2(1− 1) + 0.3(1− 0.3) + 0.2(1− 0.2) + 0.3 = 0.67.
Now, let
H˜ =
{
θ1
1
,
θ2
0.6
,
θ3
0.
,
θ4
0.1
}
.
We have
H˜c ∨ F˜ =
{
θ1
0.5
,
θ2
1
,
θ3
0.8
,
θ4
0.9
}
,
hence ∆
(S)
F˜
(H˜) = 0.5, and
(G˜ ∨ H˜)c ∨ F˜ =
{
θ1
0.5
,
θ2
1
,
θ3
0.8
,
θ4
0.8
}
,
hence ∆
(S)
F˜
(G˜ ∨ H˜) = 0.5 = ∆(S)
F˜
(G˜) ∧∆(S)
F˜
(H˜). But we have
∆
(C)
F˜
(H˜) = 0.2(1− 1) + 0.3(1− 1) + 0.2(1− 0.1) + 0.3 = 0.48
and
∆
(C)
F˜
(G˜ ∨ H˜) = 0.2(1− 1) + 0.3(1− 1) + 0.2(1− 0.2) + 0.3 = 0.46
6= ∆(C)
F˜
(G˜) ∧∆(C)
F˜
(H˜).
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3. Uncertain and fuzzy information: fuzzy mass functions
To handle cases where one consonant belief function is based on fuzzy evidence and the
other one on uncertain evidence, or to handle evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy,
we need to generalize DS and possibility theories. Such a generalization is exposed in this
section. We first review the notion of fuzzy mass function (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2, we
propose a combination operator that extends both Dempster’s rule (14) and the normalized
product (30); we also define extensions of the disjunctive operators reviewed in Section 2.2
and 2.3. The degrees of belief and plausibility of fuzzy events are then defined in Section
3.3.
3.1. Fuzzy mass functions
Following [55], let us assume that we receive uncertain and fuzzy information, which can
be modeled as follows. As in Section 2.2, we assume that the evidence can be interpreted in
different ways, and the set of interpretations is denoted by Ω. If interpretation ω ∈ Ω holds,
then we know for sure that proposition “θ is Γ˜(ω)” is true, where Γ˜(ω) is a normal fuzzy
subset of Θ. Denoting by F∗(Θ) the set of all normal fuzzy subsets of Θ, we thus have a
mapping Γ˜ : Ω → F∗(Θ). If, as before, we assume the existence of a probability measure
P on (Ω, 2Ω), then the tuple (Ω, 2Ω, P, Γ˜) is a random fuzzy set [24, 30, 31] (also called a
“fuzzy random variable” when Θ is Rp).
Let m˜ be the mapping from F∗(Θ) to [0, 1] defined as
m˜(F˜ ) := P ({ω ∈ Ω : Γ˜(ω) = F˜}).
Because Ω is assumed to be finite, there is only a finite number of fuzzy subsets F˜ such
that m˜(F˜ ) > 0, called the (fuzzy) focal sets of m. The set of focal sets is denoted as
F(m) = {F˜1, . . . , F˜f}. We also use the notation mi := m(F˜i), i = 1, . . . , n. Mapping m˜
is called a fuzzy mass function1. The notion of fuzzy mass function extends that of DS
mass function recalled in Section 2.2. The number m˜(F˜i) is interpreted as the degree with
which the evidence supports the proposition θ is F˜i, without supporting any more specific
proposition.
If interpretation ω holds, we know that “θ is Γ˜(ω)”. The possibility and necessity of a
subset A ⊆ Θ are, respectively, ΠΓ˜(ω)(A) and NΓ˜(ω)(A) defined by (23) and (24). As we only
know that interpretation ω holds with probability P ({ω}), we can compute the expected
possibility and the expected necessity [55] as
Plm˜(A) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})ΠΓ˜(ω)(A) =
f∑
i=1
miΠF˜i(A) =
f∑
i=1
mi max
θ∈A
F˜i(θ) (40)
1This notion should not be confused with that of fuzzy-valued mass function introduced in [8]. A fuzz-
valued mass function assigns fuzzy numbers to crisp focal sets, and can be interpreted as a fuzzy set of crisp
mass functions. We could, of course, “fuzzify” both the masses and the focal sets; such a generalization will
not be considered in this paper.
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and
Belm˜(A) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})NΓ˜(ω)(A) =
f∑
i=1
miNF˜i(A) =
f∑
i=1
mi min
θ 6∈A
[1− F˜i(θ)]. (41)
Functions Plm˜ and Belm˜ are, respectively, mixtures of possibility and necessity measures.
As we have seen that each necessity measure NF˜i is a belief function, and the set of belief
functions is convex, Belm˜ is still a belief function, and Plm˜ (which verifies Plm˜(A) = 1 −
Belm˜(A
c) for all A ⊆ Θ) is the dual plausibility function. The contour function of m˜ is equal
to the mean of the membership functions of its focal sets:
plm˜(θ) =
f∑
i=1
miF˜i(θ). (42)
We can also define the commonality of A as its expected guaranteed possibility from
(27):
Qm˜(A) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})∆Γ˜(ω)(A) =
f∑
i=1
mi∆F˜i(A) =
f∑
i=1
mi min
θ∈A
F˜i(θ). (43)
A fuzzy mass function m˜ with focal sets F˜1, . . . , F˜f and masses m1, . . . ,mf can also be
described as a collection of standard (crisp) mass functions αm˜ with focal sets αF˜1, . . . ,
αF˜f
and the same masses m1, . . . ,mf . Each mass function
αm˜ is induced by the random set
(Ω, 2Ω, P, αΓ˜), with αΓ˜(ω) = α[Γ˜(ω)]. From (25) and (27), we have
Belm˜(A) =
∫ 1
0
Belαm˜(A)dα, (44a)
Plm˜(A) =
∫ 1
0
Plαm˜(A)dα, (44b)
and
Qm˜(A) =
∫ 1
0
Qαm˜(A)dα (44c)
for all A ⊆ Θ.
It is important to remark that the concept of fuzzy mass functions allows us to generalize
both DS theory and possibility theory. In particular, a logical fuzzy mass function m˜ with
a single fuzzy focal set F˜ is equivalent to a possibility distribution pi = F˜ .
Remark 1. In “classical” DS theory there is a one-to-one correspondence between (crisp)
mass functions and belief functions. The fundamental reason is that, for a given belief
function Bel, the system of linear equations Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆Am(B) for all ∅ 6= A ⊆ Ω
has a unique solution. In the “fuzzified” version of DS theory, there is a many-to-one
correspondence between fuzzy mass functions and belief functions, i.e., a given belief function
can be obtained from many fuzzy mass functions. The simplest example is that of a belief
function verifying Bel(A∩B) = Bel(A)∧Bel(B) for all A,B ⊆ Θ (i.e., a necessity measure),
which, as shown in Section 2.3, can be induced both by a crisp consonant mass function and
by a logical fuzzy mass function.
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In the following section, we define a combination operator for fuzzy mass functions that
extends both the normalized product of possibility distributions (30) and Dempster’s rule
(14).
3.2. Combination of fuzzy mass functions
Let us now assume that we have two fuzzy mass functions m˜1 and m˜2 induced by inde-
pendent random fuzzy sets (Ω1, 2
Ω1 , P1, Γ˜1) and (Ω2, 2
Ω2 , P2, Γ˜2). If interpretations ω1 ∈ Ω1
and ω2 ∈ Ω2 both hold, then we can infer the fuzzy proposition “θ is Γ˜∩>(ω1, ω2)”, with
Γ˜∩>(ω1, ω2) := Γ˜1(ω1)∩ Γ˜2(ω2), where ∩> is a fuzzy intersection operator based on a t-norm
>. However, the random fuzzy set (Ω1 × Ω2, 2Ω1×Ω2 , P1 ⊗ P2, Γ˜∩>) may not be normalized,
as some fuzzy sets Γ˜∩>(ω1, ω2) may not be normal. To obtain a normal random fuzzy set,
we can replace Γ˜∩> by the mapping
Γ˜′∩>(ω1, ω2) =
Γ˜∩>(ω1, ω2)
h(Γ˜′∩>(ω1, ω2))
,
and condition P1 ⊗ P2 by the following fuzzy subset Θ˜∗ of Ω1 × Ω2, which is a natural
generalization of Θ∗ in (13):
Θ˜∗(ω1, ω2) = h(Γ˜∩>(ω1, ω2)), ∀(ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω1 × Ω2. (45)
Using Zadeh’s definition of the probability of a fuzzy event (16), the conditional probability
(P1 ⊗ P2)(· | Θ˜∗) is
(P1 ⊗ P2)(B | Θ˜∗) = (P1 ⊗ P2)(B ∩ Θ˜
∗)
(P1 ⊗ P2)(Θ˜∗)
=
∑
(ω1,ω2)∈B P1(ω1)P2(ω2)h(Γ˜∩>(ω1, ω2))∑
(ω1,ω2)∈Ω1×Ω2 P1(ω1)P2(ω2)h(Γ˜∩>(ω1, ω2))
,
for all B ⊆ Ω1 × Ω2. The fuzzy mass function generated by the random fuzzy set (Ω1 ×
Ω2, 2
Ω1×Ω2 , (P1 ⊗ P2)(· | Θ˜∗), Γ˜′∩>) is then
(m˜1 e> m˜2)(F˜ ) =
∑
G˜∩H˜=F˜ h(G˜ ∩> H˜)m˜1(G˜)m˜2(H˜)∑
(G˜,H˜)∈F(m˜1)×F(m˜2) h(G˜ ∩> H˜)m˜1(G˜)m˜2(H˜)
(46)
for all F˜ ∈ F∗(Θ). This operation was proposed by Yen [50], using > = min. The normal-
ization operation in (46) was called “soft normalization” by Yager [49].
In general, the operation e> defined by (46) is not associative. However, it is associative
if we use the product t-norm for defining the fuzzy set intersection. In the following, we will
thus define the orthogonal sum m˜1⊕ m˜2 of two fuzzy mass functions m˜1 and m˜2 (where the
symbol ⊕ has the same meaning as e> with > = product) as
(m˜1 ⊕ m˜2)(F˜ ) :=
∑
G˜H˜=F˜ h(G˜ · H˜)m˜1(G˜)m˜2(H˜)∑
(G˜,H˜)∈F(m˜1)×F(m˜2) h(G˜ · H˜)m˜1(G˜)m˜2(H˜)
, (47)
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for all F˜ ∈ F∗(Θ). The operation defined by (47) will be called the generalized product-
intersection rule. The denominator of the right-hand side of (47) can be denoted as 1− κ,
where κ can be interpreted as the degree of conflict between fuzzy mass functions m˜1 and
m˜2. It is clear that (47) is a proper generalization of (14), i.e., it gives the same result
when the focal sets of m˜1 and m˜2 are crisp. It also boils down to normalized intersection
(30) when combining two logical fuzzy mass functions m˜1 and m˜2 such that m˜1(F˜ ) = 1 and
m˜2(G˜) = 1. As a consequence of Proposition 3, the generalized product-intersection rule is
associative, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let m1, m2 and m3 be fuzzy mass functions of Θ, and let ⊕ denote the
generalized product-intersection defined by (47). Then,
(m1 ⊕m2)⊕m3 = m1 ⊕ (m2 ⊕m3).
Proof. We have
[(m1 ⊕m2)⊕m3](A˜) =
∑
H˜K˜=A˜(m1 ⊕m2)(H˜)m3(K˜)h(H˜ · K˜)∑
H˜,K˜(m1 ⊕m2)(H˜)m3(K˜)h(H˜ · K˜)
=
∑
H˜K˜=A˜
[∑
F˜G˜=H˜ m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)h(F˜ ·G˜)∑
F˜ ,G˜
m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)
]
m3(K˜)h(H˜ · K˜)∑
H˜,K˜
[∑
F˜G˜=H˜ m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)h(F˜ ·G˜)∑
F˜ ,G˜
m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)
]
m3(K˜)h(H˜K˜)
=
∑
F˜G˜K˜=A˜m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)m3(H˜)h(F˜ · G˜)h((F˜  G˜) · K˜)∑
F˜ ,G˜,K˜m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)m3(H˜)h(F˜ · G˜)h((F˜  G˜) · K˜) .
Now,
h(F˜ · G˜)h((F˜  G˜) · K˜) = h(F˜ · G˜)h( F˜ · G˜
h(F˜ · G˜) · K˜
)
= h(F˜ · G˜ · K˜).
Hence,
[(m1 ⊕m2)⊕m3](A˜) =
∑
F˜G˜K˜=A˜m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)m3(H˜)h(F˜ · G˜ · K˜)∑
F˜ ,G˜,K˜m1(F˜ )m2(G˜)m3(H˜)h(F˜ · G˜ · K˜)
. (48)
Consequently, we can permute the indices in (48) and write
(m1 ⊕m2)⊕m3 = (m2 ⊕m3)⊕m1 = m1 ⊕ (m2 ⊕m3).
Example 4. Continuing Example 1, assume that we have the following two fuzzy mass
functions:
m1(F˜ ) = 0.6, m1(Θ) = 0.4
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and
m2(G˜) = 0.7, m2(Θ) = 0.3,
where F˜ and G˜ are defined as in Example 1. As h(F˜ · G˜) = 0.8, we have
(m1 ⊕m2)(F˜  G˜) = 0.6× 0.7× 0.8
0.6× 0.7× 0.8 + 0.6× 0.3 + 0.4× 0.7 + 0.4× 0.3 ≈ 0.37
(m1 ⊕m2)(F˜ ) = 0.6× 0.3
0.6× 0.7× 0.8 + 0.6× 0.3 + 0.4× 0.7 + 0.4× 0.3 ≈ 0.20
(m1 ⊕m2)(G˜) = 0.7× 0.4
0.6× 0.7× 0.8 + 0.6× 0.3 + 0.4× 0.7 + 0.4× 0.3 ≈ 0.31
(m1 ⊕m2)(Θ) = 0.3× 0.4
0.6× 0.7× 0.8 + 0.6× 0.3 + 0.4× 0.7 + 0.4× .0.3 ≈ 0.13.
The following propositions generalize Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 5. Let m˜1 and m˜2 be two fuzzy mass functions with contour functions plm˜1
and plm˜2. Then, the contour function of m˜1 ⊕ m˜2 is given by
plm˜1⊕m˜2 =
plm˜1plm˜2
1− κ
with
κ = 1−
∑
(G˜,H˜)∈F(m˜1)×F(m˜2)
h(G˜ · H˜)m˜1(G˜)m˜2(H˜).
Proof. Let F˜1, . . . , F˜f1 and G˜1, . . . , G˜f2 be the focal sets of m˜1 and m˜2, respectively, with
corresponding masses m11, . . . ,m1f1 and m21, . . . ,m2f2 . From (42),
plm˜1⊕m˜2(θ) =
∑
i,j
m1im2jh(F˜iG˜j)
1− κ (F˜i  G˜j)(θ)
=
∑
i,jm1im2jF˜i(θ)G˜j(θ)
1− κ
=
(∑
im1iF˜i(θ)
)(∑
jm2jG˜j(θ)
)
1− κ =
plm˜1(θ)plm˜2(θ)
1− κ .
Proposition 6. Let m˜1 be a fuzzy mass function and m2 a Bayesian mass function. Then
the orthogonal sum m˜1 ⊕m2 is Bayesian and it is given by
(m˜1 ⊕m2)({θ}) =
∑f
i=1 F˜i(θ)m˜1(F˜i)m2({θ})∑
θ′∈Θ
∑f
i=1 F˜i(θ
′)m˜1(F˜i)m2({θ′})
=
plm˜1(θ)m2({θ})∑
θ′∈Θ plm˜1(θ
′)m2({θ′}) .
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Proof. As the normalized product of each focal set F˜i of m˜1 with each focal set {θ} of m2
equals {θ}, the orthogonal m˜1 ⊕m2 is Bayesian. The expression of (m˜1 ⊕m2)({θ}) follows
directly from Proposition 5.
In DS theory, it is well known that Dempster’s rule extends Bayesian conditioning, i.e.,
the orthogonal sum of a Bayesian belief function P and a logical belief function focussed on
some subset A is a Bayesian belief function that is identical to the conditional probability
measure P (· | A) [39]. In a similar way, the generalized product-intersection rule (47)
extends conditioning of a probability measure by a fuzzy event, as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. Let m be a Bayesian mass function with corresponding probability measure
P and m˜ a logical fuzzy mass function with focal set A˜ ∈ F(Θ). Then m ⊕ m˜ is Bayesian
and the corresponding belief function Belm⊕m˜ is identical to the probability measure P (· | A˜)
obtained by conditioning P by fuzzy event A˜.
Proof. From Proposition 6, m⊕ m˜ is Bayesian and it is given by
(m⊕ m˜)({θ}) = m({θ})A˜(θ)∑
θ′∈Θm({θ′})A˜(θ′)
=
P ({θ})A˜(θ)∑
θ′∈Θ P ({θ′})A˜(θ′)
.
Consequently, for any A ⊆ Θ,
Belm⊕m˜(A) =
∑
θ∈A
(m⊕ m˜)({θ}) =
∑
θ∈A P ({θ})A˜(θ)∑
θ′∈Θ P ({θ′})A˜(θ′)
= P (A | A˜).
Finally, we can remark that the disjunctive rule (15) can also be extended to fuzzy mass
functions. The extension is simpler in this case, because there is no normalization. For any
t-conorm ⊥, we can defined a disjunctive operator uniondbl⊥ as
(m˜1 uniondbl⊥ m˜2)(F˜ ) =
∑
G˜∪⊥H˜=F˜
m˜1(G˜)m˜2(H˜), (49)
where ∪⊥ denotes the union of fuzzy sets based on t-conorm ⊥. The operator uniondbl⊥ is asso-
ciative for any t-conorm. To be consistent with the conjunctive combination (47), it makes
sense to choose the probabilistic sum u⊥v = u+v−uv, which is dual to the product t-norm.
3.3. Belief and plausibility of fuzzy events
As plausibility and belief functions are, respectively, mixtures of possibility and necessity
measures, definitions for the degree of belief and the degree of plausibility of a fuzzy event
follow naturally from corresponding definitions in the possibilistic framework. As explained
in Section 2.3, there are two definitions for the possibility and the necessity of fuzzy events,
based on Sugeno and Choquet integrals. Consequently, a belief function Bel induced by a
fuzzy mass function m˜ can be extended to the lattice (F(Θ),∧,∨) in, at least, two ways,
which are described below.
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Extension based on Sugeno integrals. Based on the definitions of the possibility, necessity
and guaranteed possibility of fuzzy events (32), (33) and (37), the belief, plausibility and
commonality functions induced by a fuzzy mass function m can be extended to fuzzy events
as:
Bel
(S)
m˜ (A˜) :=
f∑
i=1
miN
(S)
F˜i
(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
mi min
θ∈Θ
(A˜ ∨ F˜ ci )(θ) (50a)
Pl
(S)
m˜ (A˜) :=
f∑
i=1
miΠ
(S)
F˜i
(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
mi max
θ∈Θ
(A˜ ∧ F˜i)(θ), (50b)
and
Q
(S)
m˜ (A˜) :=
f∑
i=1
mi∆
(S)
F˜i
(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
mi min
θ∈Θ
(A˜c ∨ F˜ )(θ). (50c)
Definitions (50a) and (50b) were first introduced by Zadeh in [55]. As the necessity measures
N
(S)
F˜i
are belief functions in the lattice (F(Θ),∧,∨), so if Bel(S)m˜ .
Extension based on Choquet integrals. Using now definitions (35) and (39) based on Choquet
integrals, we get the following extensions of function Belm˜, Plm˜ and Qm˜ to fuzzy events:
Bel
(C)
m˜ (A˜) :=
∫ 1
0
Belm˜(
αA˜)dα =
f∑
i=1
miN
(C)
F˜i
(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
miBelm
F˜i
(A˜) (51a)
Pl
(C)
m˜ (A˜) :=
∫ 1
0
Plm˜(
αA˜)dα =
f∑
i=1
miΠ
(C)
F˜i
(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
miPlm
F˜i
(A˜), (51b)
and
Q
(C)
m˜ (A˜) :=
∫ 1
0
Qm˜(
αA˜)dα =
f∑
i=1
mi∆
(C)
F˜i
(A˜) =
f∑
i=1
miQm
F˜i
(A˜), (51c)
where, as before, mF˜i is the consonant mass functions such that plmF˜i
= piF˜i . Definitions
(51a) and (51b) were first proposed by Yen [50].
We can remark that definitions (50) and (51) coincide when either all focal sets are crisp,
or the event A˜ is crisp. From (36), definitions (51) also extend (44), i.e., we have
Bel
(C)
m˜ (A˜) =
∫ 1
0
Belαm˜(A˜)dα, (52a)
Pl
(C)
m˜ (A˜) =
∫ 1
0
Plαm˜(A˜)dα, (52b)
and
Q
(C)
m˜ (A˜) =
∫ 1
0
Qαm˜(A˜)dα (52c)
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for all A˜ ∈ F(Θ). Overall, both (50) and (51) seem to provide sensible definitions to quantify
the degrees of belief and plausibility of fuzzy events based on uncertain and fuzzy evidence.
Yen [50] argued for (51) by showing that the Choquet integrals are more sensitive to small
changes in the fuzzy focal sets F˜i than the Sugeno integrals. This argument could actually
be reversed, as membership functions of fuzzy sets are usually difficult to determine precisely
in practice, and the relative insensitivity of the degrees of belief and plausibility to small
perturbations of the membership functions of the focal sets could rather be considered as
an advantage. On the other hand, the fact that, for instance, Bel
(C)
m˜ (A˜) can be determined
by computing Belβm˜(
αA˜) for all α and β, and then by integrating over α and β, is a nice
property of the Choquet integral. More research is needed to find decisive arguments in
favor of any of these two approaches.
4. Application to statistical inference
In the following, we apply the general framework outlined in Section 3 to statistical
inference. The consonant likelihood-based belief function, first proposed by Shafer [39] will
first be recalled in Section 4.1, together with its axiomatic justification provided in [10]. In
Section 4.2, we show that, by adding one axiom and enlarging the solution space, we can
justify the representation of sample information by a fuzzy mass function with a single focal
set, equal to the relative likelihood function. Binomial inference is used as an illustrative
example in Section 4.3.
4.1. Likelihood-based belief function
Let us consider a statistical inference problem in which the observable data X ∈ X
is randomly generated according to a probability mass or density function f(x;θ), where
θ is a parameter whose value is only known to belong to a finite set Θ. After observing
a realization x of X, we wish to represent the information about θ by a belief function
Bel(·;x) on Θ. Different approaches to this problem have been proposed by several authors,
generalizing either Bayesian inference [4, 6, 7] or frequentist concepts such as confidence
regions and p-values [2, 14, 33, 32].
A particularly simple and appealing solution, proposed by Shafer [39], is to consider the
consonant belief function whose contour function is equal to the relative likelihood:
pl0(θ;x) :=
L(θ;x)
maxθ′∈Θ L(θ′;x)
, (53a)
where L(·;x) : θ → f(x; θ) is the likelihood function. The corresponding plausibility and
belief functions are, thus, defined as:
Pl0(A;x) = max
θ∈A
pl0(θ;x) (53b)
and
Bel0(A;x) = 1− Pl0(Ac;x) = 1−max
θ 6∈A
pl0(θ;x), (53c)
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for all A ⊆ Θ. This likelihood-based belief function has several interesting properties dis-
cussed in [10]. In particular, combining Bel0(·;x) with a Bayesian prior probability mass
function (PMF) on Θ yields the Bayesian posterior PMF.
The consonant belief function (53), introduced in [39] on intuitive grounds, can be jus-
tified from the Least Commitment Principle (LCP) [10]. This principle states that, when
several belief functions satisfy some requirements for a reasonable representation of a given
belief state, the least informative should be chosen [44]. Here, we consider the following
requirement, which states that combining BelΘ(·;x) with a prior PMF pi(θ) by Dempster’s
rule yields the Bayesian posterior.
Requirement 1 (Compatibility with Bayesian inference). Let pi(θ) be a prior PMF. Then
pi ⊕Bel(·;x) = P (· | x), (54)
where P (· | x) is the PMF on Θ defined by
P (θ | x) = L(θ;x)pi(θ)∑
θ′∈Θ L(θ
′;x)pi(θ′)
for all θ ∈ Θ.
To apply the LCP, we need a way to compare the “information content” of belief func-
tions. Here, we consider the Q-ordering relation [20] defined as follows: given two belief
functions Bel1 and Bel2, with commonality functions Q1 and Q2, Bel1 is Q-less committed
than Bel2 iff for all A ⊆ Θ, Q1(A) ≥ Q2(A). The following proposition was proved in [10].
Proposition 8. Belief function Bel0(·;x) defined by (53) is the Q-least committed belief
function verifying Requirement 1.
Proof. From Proposition 2, Requirement 1 implies that
Q({θ}) = pl(θ) = cL(θ;x),
for all θ ∈ Θ and for some constant c. The largest admissible value of c is
c0 = [max
θ∈Θ
L(θ;x)]−1.
Hence, the Q-least committed belief function verifying Requirement 1 must be such that
Q({θ}) = L(θ;x)
maxθ′∈Θ L(θ′;x)
= pl0(θ;x).
Now, for any commonality function Q, we have
Q(A) ≤ min
θ∈A
Q({θ})
for all A ⊆ Θ. Consequently, we must have Q(A) ≤ minθ∈A pl0(θ;x) for all A ⊆ Θ. The
commonality function Q0 corresponding to Bel0 verifies Q0(A) = minθ∈A pl0(θ;x). Conse-
quently, Q0(A) ≥ Q(A) for all A and all Q verifying Requirement 1.
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Proposition 8 means that Bel0(·;x) is, in some sense, the least informative belief function
verifying Requirement 1. If we see the belief function Bel0(·;x) as being induced by a
consonant mass function m0(·;x), there is, however, a problem with this representation: if x
and y are the outcomes of independent random experiments with the same parameter space
Θ, then m0(·;x, y) is not equal to the orthogonal sum of m0(·;x) and m0(·; y), even though
the two pieces of evidence x and y are independent. Indeed, it seems reasonable to impose
the following requirement.
Requirement 2 (Combination of independent outcomes). Let x and y be the outcomes of
independent random experiments with the same parameter space Θ. Let m(·;x), m(·; y) and
m(·;x, y) denote the mass functions on Θ induced, respectively, by the observation of x, y
and (x, y). Then
m(·;x, y) = m(·;x)⊕m(·; y).
The fact that mass function m0(·;x) fails to meet Requirement 2 led Shafer to eventually
reject it as a rational representation of statistical evidence [41]. It can be shown [46, 26]
that the only mass function m(·;x) verifying Requirements 1 and 2, as well as the strong
likelihood principle (i.e., depending only on the relative likelihood) and some additional
regularity properties, is Bayesian and has the following expression:
m({θ};x) = L(θ;x)∑
θ′∈Θ L(θ
′;x)
.
Hence, Requirement 2 seems to rule out belief function Bel0, as well as any other non-
additive representation of statistical evidence, an argument used by Halpern and Fagin to
question the usefulness of belief functions [26]. However, this conclusion does not hold if
we enlarge the solution space to include fuzzy mass functions, as will be shown in the next
section.
4.2. Representation of statistical information as a fuzzy mass function
Belief function Bel0(·;x) defined by (53) is induced by a single crisp consonant mass
function m0(·;x), but it is also induced by fuzzy mass functions. In particular, it is induced
by the fuzzy mass function m˜0(·;x) such that m˜0(L˜x;x) = 1, where L˜x is the fuzzy subset
of Θ with membership function
L˜x(θ) =
L(θ;x)
maxθ′∈Θ L(θ′;x)
= pl0(θ;x)
for all θ ∈ Θ. Fuzzy set L˜x can be seen as the fuzzy set of likely values of θ after observing
x. It is clear that m˜0(·;x) meets Requirement 2. Indeed, if x and y are independent
observations,
L˜x,y = L˜x  L˜y
and
m˜0(·;x, y) = m˜0(·;x)⊕ m˜0(·; y).
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As a consequence of Proposition 6, m˜0(·;x) also meets Requirement 1. Fuzzy mass func-
tion m˜0(·;x) thus seems to be an adequate representation of statistical evidence: it verifies
both requirements, and the associated belief function is the Q-least committed subject to
Requirement 1.
We can remark that there are other fuzzy mass functions that induce Bel0(·;x). They
are characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. A fuzzy mass function m˜ on Θ = {θ1, . . . , θq} with focal sets F˜1, . . . , F˜f and
masses m1, . . . ,mf verifies Belm˜ = Bel0 if and only if
f∑
i=1
miF˜i = L˜x (55)
and there exists a permutation σ of {1, . . . , q} such that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , f},
F˜i(θσ(1)) ≤ F˜i(θσ(2)) ≤ . . . ≤ F˜i(θσ(q)). (56)
Proof. From (42), condition (55) is necessary and sufficient to ensure that plm˜(θ) = Qm˜({θ}) =
pl0(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Now, for any A ⊆ Θ,
Qm˜(A) =
f∑
i=1
mi min
θ∈A
F˜i(θ)
If (56) holds, then, for any A ⊆ Θ, there exists θA in Θ such that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , f},
F˜i(θA) = minθ∈A F˜i(θ). We then have
Qm˜(A) =
f∑
i=1
miF˜i(θA) = min
θ∈A
f∑
i=1
miF˜i(θ) = min
θ∈A
Qm˜({θ}) = Q0(A).
Conversely, assume that Qm˜(A) = Q0(A) = minθ∈A pl0({θ}) for all A ⊆ Θ. Let σ be a
permutation of {1, . . . , q} such that
pl0(θσ(1)) ≤ pl0(θσ(2)) ≤ . . . ≤ pl0(θσ(q)).
For any k ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, we have
Q({θσ(k)}) = Q({θσ(k), θσ(k+1)}),
i.e.,
f∑
i=1
miF˜i(θσ(k)) =
f∑
i=1
mi min
(
F˜i(θσ(k)), F˜i(θσ(k+1))
)
,
which implies that F˜i(θσ(k)) ≤ F˜i(θσ(k+1)) for all k and all i.
There are, thus, infinitely many fuzzy mass functions m˜ that induce Bel0. Let m˜(·;x)
and m˜(·; y) be fuzzy mass functions corresponding to Bel0(·;x) and Bel0(·; y), assumed to
have each f focal sets. Then, m˜(·;x) ⊕ m˜(·; y) will generally have f 2 focal sets and will
be different form m˜(·;x, y), except if f = 1. Consequently, Requirement 2 seems to justify
m˜0 as a fuzzy mass function representation of Bel0, which is the Q-least committed belief
function satisfying Requirement 1.
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4.3. Application to binomial inference
Let us consider an urn with a known number N of balls and an unknown proportion θ of
black balls. Thus, θ ∈ Θ = {0, 1/N, 2/N, . . . , (N − 1)/N, 1}. Assume that we have observed
x black balls in n draws with replacement. The likelihood function is
L(θ;x) =
(
n
x
)
θx(1− θ)n−x.
Let θ̂x be the maximum likelihood estimate:
θ̂x = arg max
θ∈Θ
L(θ;x).
The fuzzy set L˜x of likely values of θ after observing x has membership function
L˜x(θ) =
L(θ;x)
L(θ̂x;x)
=
(
θ
θ̂x
)x(
1− θ
1− θ̂x
)n−x
.
The statistical evidence is represented by mass function m˜0(·;x) such that m˜0(L˜x;x) = 1.
By construction, combining m˜0(·;x) by Dempster’s rule with a Bayesian prior yields the
Bayesian posterior. For instance, combining m˜0(·;x) with a uniform prior yields the posterior
PMF
p(θ | x) ∝ θx(1− θ)n−x.
If we now perform a second random experiment in which we observe y black balls out of
q draws, the combined evidence about θ is represented by the fuzzy mass function
m0(·, x, y) = m0(·, x)⊕m0(·, y)
with the single fuzzy focal set L˜x,y = L˜x  L˜y.
Frequentist properties. The previous analysis applies after the random experiment has been
performed and the number x of black balls has been observed. Before the experiment has
been performed, the number X of black balls is a random variable with binomial distribution,
and we can consider the random set (ΩX , 2
ΩX , PX|θ0 , Γ˜), where ΩX = {0, 1, . . . , n} is the
sample space of X, PX|θ0 is the probability distribution of X for the true value θ0 of the
parameter, and Γ˜(x) = L˜x. The corresponding fuzzy mass function m˜ is given by
m˜(L˜x) = PX|θ0({x}) =
(
n
x
)
θx0(1− θ0)n−x
for all x ∈ ΩX . The plausibility plm˜(θ0) of θ0 is a random variable that take values L˜x(θ0),
for x ∈ Ω, with probabilities Pθ0({x}). If N is large enough so that θ can be treated as a
continuous parameter, we have, by Wilks’ theorem [47],
−2 log plm˜(θ0) d−→ χ21
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Table 1: Coverage probabilities of confidence regions cαL˜X for α = 0.01, α = 0.05 and α = 0.1, with
θ0 = 0.3.
Coverage probability
1− α N = 100, n = 50 N = n = 100 N = n = 1000
0.99 0.9927 0.9922 0.9894
0.95 0.9570 0.9525 0.9511
0.90 0.8825 0.9025 0.8955
and n→∞. Consequently,
P (−2 log plm˜(θ0) ≤ χ21;1−α) = P (plm˜(θ0) ≥ exp(−0.5χ21;1−α))→ 1− α,
i.e., the cα-cut of L˜X , with cα = exp(−0.5χ21;1−α), is an asymptotic confidence region for θ
at level 1 − α. This property is illustrated in Figure 1 for θ0 = 0.3 and three cases: (1)
N = 100, n = 10, (2) N = n = 100 and N = n = 1000. The true confidence levels of regions
cαL˜X for α = 0.01, α = 0.05 and α = 0.1 are shown in Table 1.
Prediction. Assume that we have picked x black balls out of n draws with replacement,
and we now want to predict the number Y of black balls that will be obtained in another
random experiment in which r balls will be drawn with replacement from the same urn.
This prediction problem was addressed in [28, 29] in the belief function framework. The
approach introduced in [28] is to write Y as a function ϕ(θ,U) of parameter θ and a pivotal
random variable U with known probability distribution. A predictive belief function on Y is
then obtained by combining the relation Y = ϕ(θ,U) with the belief function on θ derived
from the likelihood function. Here, we can write
Y =
r∑
i=1
I(Ui ≤ θ), (57)
where U = (U1, . . . , Ur) has a uniform distribution in [0, 1]
r.
For a given realization u = (u1, . . . , ur) of U , the fuzzy constraint “θ is L˜x” induces a
fuzzy constraint “Y is Y˜x,u”, where Y˜x,u is a fuzzy subset of ΩY = {0, . . . , r} whose mem-
bership function can be computed using the extension principle [53] as
Y˜x,u(y) = max{θ:y=∑ri=1 I(ui≤θ) L˜x(θ).
The mapping u → Y˜x,u and the probability distribution of U thus jointly define a random
fuzzy set of ΩY . The corresponding fuzzy mass function µ˜x is defined by
µ˜x(A˜) = P ({u ∈ [0, 1]r : Y˜x,u = A˜}),
for all A˜ ∈ F∗(ΩY ).
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Figure 1: True cdf of pl0(θ0;X) = L˜X(θ) (broken lines) and asymptotic approximation (solid lines) for
N = 100 and n = 50 (a), N = n = 100 (b) and N = n = 1000 (c).
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It can be shown that the predictive belief function generated by µ˜x also has an interesting
frequentist property [14]. As before, let cα = exp(−0.5χ21;1−α), let cαµ˜x be the (crisp) mass
function whose focal sets are the cα-cuts of the fuzzy focal sets of µ˜x, and let
cαBelµ˜x be the
corresponding function. Then for any α ∈ (0, 1), we have, asymptotically,
PX|θ0
({
x ∈ ΩX : ∀A ⊆ ΩY , cαBelµ˜x(A) ≤ PY |θ0(A)
}) ≥ 1− α, (58)
i.e., cαBelµ˜x dominates the true probability distribution PY |θ0 of Y for a proportion of the
samples at least equal to 1 − α. Function cαBelµ˜x is, thus, a predictive belief function at
confidence level 1− α, according to the terminology introduced in [9].
As a numerical example, assume that we have observed x = 28 black balls out of n = 100
draws with replacement from an urn with N = 100 balls, and we wish to predict the number
Y of black balls in r = 4 future draws from the same urn. The belief and plausibility of any
event A ⊆ ΩY can be approximated by Monte Carlo simulation. More precisely, we generate
K realizations u1, . . . ,uK of U , and we approximate Plµ˜x(A) and Belµ˜x(A) and, for any
A ⊆ ΩY as, respectively
Plµ˜x(A) ≈
1
K
K∑
k=1
max
θ∈A
Y˜x,uk(θ)
and
Belµ˜x(A) ≈ 1−
1
K
K∑
k=1
max
θ 6∈A
Y˜x,uk(θ).
In particular, the contour function is approximated as
plµ˜x(θ) ≈
1
K
K∑
k=1
Y˜x,uk(θ)
Figure 2a shows a plot of the contour function plµ˜x together with the plug-in PMF pY |θ̂x , with
θ̂x = x/n = 0.28. Figure 2b displays the lower and upper cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) defined, respectively, as F∗(y) = Belµ˜x((−∞, y]) and F ∗(y) = Plµ˜x((−∞, y]), to-
gether with the plug-in CDF FY |θ̂x(y) = PY |θ̂((−∞, y]). We can remark that, as L˜x(θ̂x) = 1,
we have
Belµ˜x(A) ≤ PY |θ̂(A) ≤ Plµ˜x(A)
for all A ⊆ ΩY , which is verified in Figure 2b for A = (−∞, y] with y ∈ ΩY .
To check the frequentist property (58) experimentally, we computed the coverage prob-
ability on the left-hand side of (58) for α ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1}. In this expression, cαBelµ˜x(A)
can be approximated as
cαBelµ˜x(A) ≈
1
K
K∑
k=1
I(cαY˜x,uk ⊆ A).
We set K = 15, 000 in this simulation. The estimated probabilities are shown in Table 2.
They are close to the nominal values 1− α.
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Figure 2: Views of the predictive belief function for n = 100, x = 28, N = 100 and r = 4. (a): Predictive
contour function plµ˜x and true probability mass function pY |θ0 (with θ0 = 0.3); (b): Lower, upper and true
CDFs.
Table 2: Estimated coverage probabilities of predictive belief functions cαBelµ˜x α = 0.01, α = 0.05 and
α = 0.1, with θ0 = 0.3.
1− α 0.99 0.95 0.90
Coverage probability 0.9907 0.9496 0.8913
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Figure 3 shows the belief degrees cαBelµ˜x(A) against the true probabilities PY |θ0(A) for
the 25 = 32 subsets of ΩY and 9 values of x, with α = 0.05. We can verify that we have, for
the most probable values of x (x ∈ {22, 26, 30, 34, 38}), cαBelµ˜x(A) ≤ PY |θ0(A) for all A.
Probability of fuzzy events. The formalism exposed in Section 3.3 allows us to compute the
belief and plausibility degrees of fuzzy events. For example, consider the fuzzy event: “Most
balls will be black”, where “most” corresponds to the following fuzzy subset of ΩY :
A˜ :=
{
0
0
,
1
0
,
2
0.5
,
3
0.75
,
4
1
}
.
Using Zadeh’s definitions (50) for the belief and plausibility of fuzzy event based on the
Sugeno integral, we get
Bel
(S)
µ˜x
(A˜) ≈ 1
K
K∑
k=1
min
y∈ΩY
(A˜ ∨ Y˜ cx,uk)(y)
and
Pl
(S)
µ˜x
(A˜) ≈ 1
K
K∑
k=1
max
y∈ΩY
(A˜ ∧ Y˜x,uk)(y).
For x = 28, we find Bel
(S)
µ˜x
(A˜) ≈ 0.143 and Pl(S)µ˜x (A˜) ≈ 0.253. Using definitions (51) based
on the Choquet integral, we have
Bel
(C)
µ˜x
(A˜) = 0.5Bel
(C)
µ˜x
({2, 3, 4}) + 0.25Bel(C)µ˜x ({3, 4}) + 0.25Bel
(C)
µ˜x
({4}) ≈ 0.128
and
Pl
(C)
µ˜x
(A˜) = 0.5Pl
(C)
µ˜x
({2, 3, 4}) + 0.25Pl(C)µ˜x ({3, 4}) + 0.25Pl
(C)
µ˜x
({4}) ≈ 0.236.
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Figure 3: Degrees of belief cαBelµ˜x(A) (vertical axes) vs. true probabilities PY |θ0(A) (horizontal axes) or
the 25 = 32 subsets of ΩY = {0, . . . , 4} and 9 values of x, with α = 0.05.
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5. Conclusion
We have revisited Zadeh’s notion of “evidence of the second kind” and outlined it im-
portance as a generalization of both DS and possibility theories. According to this general
view, Possibility theory deals with belief functions generated by fuzzy sets, while DS theory
deals with belief functions generated by random sets (or, equivalently, mass functions in the
finite setting). Both theories fall under the umbrella of a a more general formalism dealing
with belief functions induced by random fuzzy sets, or fuzzy mass functions in the finite
case. This general formalism can be called “Epistemic random fuzzy set theory” (Figure
4). The adjective “epistemic” reminds us that, in this approach, a random fuzzy set is not
seen as a model of a random mechanism for generating fuzzy data, but as a representation
of evidence, the meaning of which can be both uncertain and fuzzy.
In this general approach, a belief function is only a partial representation of evidence,
which is fully represented by the underlying random fuzzy set. In particular, two independent
pieces of evidence must be combined at the “random fuzzy set” level. For instance, two
possibility measures (or consonant belief functions) should be combined using the normalized
product rule of Possibility theory if they are generated by fuzzy sets, and by Dempster’s rule
is they are generated by random sets. These two combination mechanisms are special cases
of a generalized product-intersection rule, which allows us to combine independent pieces of
evidence that are both uncertain and fuzzy.
As an application of this general framework, we have considered statistical inference.
Shafer [39] first proposed to represent statistical evidence by the consonant belief function
such that the plausibility of each single parameter value equals its relative likelihood. How-
ever, this representation was soon found to be problematic, as the belief function induced
by the union of two independent samples is not equal to the orthogonal sum of the belief
functions induced by each of the samples. This problem actually occurs only if we see the
likelihood-based belief function as being generated by a crisp consonant mass function, i.e.,
if we see statistical evidence as uncertain. The problem disappears if we see statistical evi-
dence as fuzzy, the relative likelihood function being interpreted as the membership function
of the fuzzy set of likely values of the parameter. This perspective is consistent with the
intuition of several authors who noticed the possibilistic nature of the concept of likelihood
(see, e.g., [43]). Possibility theory alone, however, is not expressive enough to support the
development a theory of statistical inference as it does not allow us to represent, for instance,
the combination of the likelihood with a Bayesian prior. The more general epistemic ran-
dom fuzzy set theory allows us to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with
Bayesian inference, and is rich enough to accommodate both “likelihoodist” and Bayesian
views of statistical inference.
Throughout this paper, we have only considered finite sets to keep the level of mathe-
matical exposition elementary. However, the whole framework developed in this paper can
be extended to infinite spaces such as Rn without much difficulty, using existing results
on random fuzzy sets in a more general setting (see, e.g., [3] and references therein). The
practical application of such models to statistical inference or other uncertainty quantifica-
tion problems will require the use of Monte Carlo simulation and numerical approximation
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Epistemic random fuzzy set theory
(random fuzzy sets)
Possibility theory
(fuzzy sets)
Dempster-Shafer theory
(random sets)
Probability theory
(random points)
Boolean possibility theory
(sets)
Figure 4: Overview of different theories of uncertainty, from the loss general ones (bottom) to the most
general (top).
techniques such as developed in [29, 45, 13]. Results in this direction will be reported in
future publications.
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